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LABoR LAw-STATE REGULATION OF R.EcoGNITION AND ORGANI-

PrcKETING-Just as the fixed circumference of spheres of
influence tends to reduce clash and friction in world affairs, so peaceful
industrial relations are fostered by definite legal rules of conduct.
Recent litigation, both by its amount and variety of result, testifies to a
continued uncertainty as to the permissible scope of peaceful, primary
picketing. The major problems may be subsumed under the loose cateZATIONAL
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gory of "stranger picketing,"1 but a distinction of some legal significance
has developed within this category between picketing by the non-representative union for recognition by the employer and picketing for
organizational purposes, that is, to win the reluctant:2 employees into
the union's fold. The complexity of human motivation makes this
distinction difficult to administer, even if it were valid; the fact that,
whatever the union's motivation, the effect of such picketing upon the
business enterprise is likely to be the same suggests the invalidity of
such a distinction as a fulcrum of legal decision. The distinction, however, will be recognized in the structure of this comment because of its
acceptance by some courts.
·
Whether the stranger union is picketing for recognition or to organize the employees directly, in the typical case, union expansionism
clashes with the employees' right, subject to the will of the majority,
to choose freely between unions or to choose no union. 3 Caught in
between is the harassed employer who is unwilling or unable legally
to compel his employees to accede to union demands that they organize.
State efforts to regulate this problem in social dynamics have been vexed
by a double uncertainty: (1) Assuming that the state court has jurisdiction, to what extent does the Fourteenth Amendment protect such
picketing as a form of speech? (2) Where the dispute affects interstate
commerce, has the Labor-Management Relations Act occupied the field,
ousting the state courts of jurisdiction? Neither question is susceptible
of a complete answer with federal law in its present posture. It may be
useful, nevertheless, to survey this confused area, indicating what certainty there does exist and possible solutions to questions unresolved.

I. The Inhibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment
I

Assuming that no state policy or law supports the employer's application for an injunction against the picketing,4 the question remains
1 Although the term "stranger picketing" may be used to include picketing by a union
which represents none or which represents only a minority, no attempt will be made in this
comment to differentiate the two situations, for the courts have not placed special emphasis
upon such a distinction.
2 In the cases considered, the employees have either failed to accept the picketing union
or have deliberately rejected it by a formal or informal ballot.
3 Where a rival union is competing for employee allegiance or where the employees are
already represented by another union, additional reasons militate against stranger picketing.
Except where specifically adverted to, these situations will not be covered in this comment.
4 State law of course may protect such picketing irrespective of the 14th Amendment.
It may be observed, however, that the states have not felt restricted by state anti-injunction
statutes in dealing with this problem; see, for example, Matson Navigation Co. v. Brotherhood of Marine Engineers, 22 CCH Lab. Cas. ,r67,057 (1952); Gooclwins v. Hagedorn, 303
N.Y. 300, 101 N.E. (2d) 697 (1951).
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whether the state court can constitutionally act. It would be rethreshing
old straw to trace extensively the United States Supreme Court's process
of inclusion and exclusion in determining under what circumstances
picketing is entitled to the shield of Fourteenth Amendment due process,5 but it will not be inapposite briefly to sketch the shift in judicial
attitude in recent years. In 1950, just ten years after the original assimilation of picketing to free speech in Thornhill 11. Alabama,6 the Court in
the Gazzam-Hughes-Hanke7 trilogy was disposed to recognize that such
identification involved the fallacy of the unequal equation. Justice Frankfurter said, "... we must start with the fact that while picketing has an
ingredient of communication it cannot dogmatically be equated with
the constitutionally protected freedom of speech ..."8 and "... the very
purpose of a picket line is to exert influences, and it produces consequences, different from other modes of communication. The loyalties
and responses evoked and exacted by picket lines are unlike those £lowing from appeals by printed word." 9
As a corollary, the Court stated that it would accord the highest
respect to state prohibition of peaceful picketing where the objective
of such picketing was contrary to state policy, either legislatively1° or
judicially declared.11 Union protest notwithstanding, this retreat from
the Thornhill doctrine was not quite a giving of carte blanche to the
states, for the burden remained upon the state to justify its formulation
of unlawful objectives upon a rational basis, and it is doubtful that a
sweeping ban on picketing as such would be tolerated.12 Furthermore,
the Court's prior holdings protecting various forms of picketing have
not been expressly overruled.
5 Of the abundant literature on this subject, the following recent articles seem most
useful: Tanenhaus, "Picketing-Free Speech: The Growth of the New Law of Picketing from
1940-1952," 38 CoRN. L.Q. l (1952); Fraenkel, "Peaceful Picketing-Constitutionally
Protected?" 99 UNIV. PA. L. RBv. 1 (1950); comment, 26 N.Y. UNIV. L.Q. 183 (1951).
6 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736 (1940).
7 Building Service Employees Intl. Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 70 S.Ct. 784
(1950); Intl. Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 70 S.Ct. 773 (1950);
Hughes v. Superior Court of California, 339 U.S. 460, 70 S.Ct. 718 (1950).
8 Speaking for the Court in Intl. Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470
at 474, 70 S.Ct. 773 (1950).
9 Speaking for the Court in Hughes v. Superior Court of California, 339 U.S. 460 at
465, 70 S.Ct. 718 (1950).
10 Building Service Employees Intl. Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 70 S.Ct. 784
(1950). It should be noted that the Court in this case declared, at 540, that it was immaterial whether the state statute imposed criminal sanctions, thus extending the prior ruling
in Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 69 S.Ct. 684 (1949).
11 Hughes v. Superior Court of California, 339 U.S. 460, 70 S.Ct. 718 (1950).
12 See Tanenhaus, "Picketing-Free Speech: The Growth of the New Law of Picketing from 1940-1952," 38 CoRN. L.Q. 1 at 47-50 (1952), for an excellent summary of the
present position of the Court.
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Narrowing inquiry to the Court's treatment of stranger picketing,
the shift in judicial attitude outlined above is mirrored in two decisions.
In 1941, in the Swing case13 a state court, upon the application of both
the employer and his employees, had enjoined picketing by a· stranger
union on the theory that no labor dispute was involved. In striking
down this injunction, the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice
Frankfurter, said: "A state cannot exclude workingmen from peacefully exercising the right of free communication by drawing the circle
of economic competition between employers and workers so small as
to contain only an employer and those directly employed by him. The
interdependence of economic interest of all engaged in the same industry has become a commonplace."14
Nine years later, in Building Service Employees Intl. Union v. Gazzam,15 a case substantially like the Swing case on its facts, an injunction
was sustained where based on the finding that such picketing violated
state policy because it was for the purpose of inducing the employer to
coerce his employees to join the union. The Swing case was limited to
the precise holding that a state could not enjoin peaceful picketing solely
on the ground that no labor dispute existed between the employer and
his employees. Even prior to the nihil obstat of the Gazzam decision,
many state courts had enjoined recognition picketing,16 but Gazzam
had the effect of authoritatively clearing away the suspected inhibitions
of the Swing case. The recent decisions are uniform in prohibiting
recognition picketing, either on the basis of statute17 or judicially declared policy,1 8 where it is found from prior demands upon the employer for recognition or from misleading banners as to the employer's
13 American

Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 61 S.Ct. 568 (1941).
at 326.
15 339 U.S. 532, 70 S.Ct. 784 (1950).
16 For the division of authority prior to the Gazzam decision, see Annotation, 11 A.L.R.
(2d) 1338 (1950).
1 7 The cases are too numerous for exhaustive citation, but see, for example, Saperstein
v. Rich, 114 N.Y.S. (2d) 779 (1952); WERB v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local
200, 22 CCH Lab. Cas. ,r67,162 (1952); Blue Boar Cafeteria Co. v. Hotel and Restaurant
Employees & Bartenders Intl. Union, (Ky. App. 1953) 254 S.W. (2d) 335; Klibanoff v.
Tri-Cities Retail Clerks' Union, 23 CCH Lab. Cas. ,r67,468 (1953); and compare Kenmike
Theatre Inc. v. Moving Picture Operators, Local 304, 139 Conn. 95, 90 A. (2d) 881
(1952), with Torrington Drive-in Corp. v. Intl. Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees,
17 Conn. Supp. 417, 21 CCH Lab. Cas. ,r66,852 (1951). For a review of the many New
York decisions on picketing for recognition, see Petro "Recognition and Organizational
Picketing in 1952,'' ~ LAD. L.J. 819 (1952). It should be noted, however, that decisions
remain on the books in many states permitting recognition picketing, most of them on the
basis of the Swing case. See, for example, Watson Co. v. Wilson, 187 Tenn. 402, 215 S.W.
(2d) 801 (1948).
1s Bitzer Motor Co. v. Local 604, (ill. App. 1953) 110 N.E. (2d) 674.
14 Id.
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position in the labor dispute that the union's purpose is to pressure the
employer to interfere with his employees' freedom of choice.19
Where the union has been astute to clarify the purpose of its picketing as organizational or where it seeks to defeat the injunction by promising to picket solely for the purpose of organizing the reluctant employees, there is some question whether the court can constitutionally
enjoin such activity. The uncertainty stems from Justice Minton's language in the Gazzam case where, speaking for the Court, he limited the
impact of that decision to recognition picketing and stated:
"The Washington statute has not been construed by the Washington courts in this case to prohibit picketing of workers by other
workers. The construction of the statute which we are reviewing
only prohibits coercion of workers by employers. We cannot agree
with petitioners' reading of this injunction that 'whatever types of
picketing were to be carried out by the union would be in violation
of that decree.' Respondent does not contend that picketing per se
has been enjoined but only that picketing which has as its purpose
violation of the policy of the State. There is no contention that
picketing directed at employees for organizational purposes would
be violative of that policy."20
While it is probably overstatement to maintain that the above language
affirmatively extends the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment to
organizational picketing, the state courts which have been cognizant of
this language have been reluctant to test its force by a prohibition of
organizational picketing as such.21
Perhaps the easiest method of coping with this potential constitutional problem is to avoid it by a finding that the union's motivations
are inseparably entangled and that since one purpose is to coerce the
employer, this makes all further picketing enjoinable.22 Where there
is no basis for such a finding, however, the court must face the problem.
And a pressing problem it is. For whatever the union's avowed motive,
it is the employer who is forced to bear the economic impact of the
picketing. 23
19 Bickford's Inc. v. Mesevich, 107 N.Y.S. (2d) 369 (1951); Metropolis Country
Club, Inc. v. Lewis, 114 N.Y.S. (2d) 620, affd. 280 App. Div. 816, 113 N.Y.S. (2d) 923
(1952).
2 0 Building Service Employees Intl. Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 at 539-540, 70
S.Ct. 784 (1950).
2 1 Painters and Paperhangers Local 1018, AFL v. Rountree Corp., (Va. 1952) 72
S.E. (2d) 402; Goodwins Inc. v. Hagedorn, 21 CCH Lab. Cas. ,r66,893 (1952), decision
after remand from 303 N.Y. 300, 101 N.E. (2d) 697 (1951).
22 Katz Drug Co. v. Kavner, (Mo. 1952) 249 S.W. (2d) 166.
23 Although one court was hopeful that a clarification of the placards would ease the
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Recent decisions in New York24 and Pennsylvania25 dealing with
organizational picketing seem to subvert the "motivation analysis" underlying a distinction between recognition and organizational picketing
by reasoning from the effect of such picketing upon the employer to a
finding that the union's purpose was to bring pressure to bear upon him
to compel his employees to join the union or to grant recognition.
While this rationale finds support in the realities of the situation26 and
in the principle that the law will find that a person intends the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his acts, it leaves the unions free to
picket only so long as the picketing has no economic impact. It is interesting to note that the Pennsylvania court, as an alternative ground for
the injunction, quoted from the Swing case: "The right of free communication cannot therefore be mutilated by denying it to workers, in
a dispute with an employer, even though they are not in his employ."27
The court reasoned from this statement that since the union asserted it
had no dispute with the employer, it was not constitutionally protected
in making him bear the onus of the pressure exerted.
But assuming arguendo that there is no coercion of the employer,
perhaps a stronger objection to organizational picketing may be found
in the coercion of the employees. Several states have statutes which by
their terms prohibit coercion of employee choice as to unionism by any
person.28 In the recent Postma case,29 the Michigan Supreme Court,
relying on language in previous decisions,30 seems to interpret the Michigan Labor Relations Act:3 1 so as to make it unlawful for the union to
picket to bring pressure upon employees " ... either directly or indirectly
pressure on the employer [Haber & Fink v. "John Jones," 277 App. Div. 176, 98 N.Y.S.
(2d) 393 (1950)], in the majority of cases the employer has suffered harassment by the
refusal of union men supplying the enterprise to cross any picket line, regardless of the
nature of the dispute.
24 Amazon v. Local 178, Hotel and Restaurant Beverage Dispensers Industrial Union,
23 CCH Lab. Cas. ,r67,469 (1953).
2 5 Matson Navigation Co. v. Brotherhood of Marine Engineers, 22 CCH Lab. Cas.
,r67,057 (1952).
2 6 Query whether there can be a case of organizational picketing pur et simple unless
the picketing is conducted before the homes of the employees?
27 American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 at 326, 61 S.Ct. 568 (1941).
Emphasis added.
28 See, for example, Ala. Code (1940) tit. 26, §383; Mich. Comp. Laws (1948)
§423.17. And consider the possibility of such an interpretation of S.D. 1947 Sessions Laws,
c. 92, §4. Arizona has recently passed a statute which prohibits stranger picketing for
whatever purpose, 4 CCH Labor Law Rep. (Arizona) ,r41,510.
29 Postma v. Intl. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 334 Mich. 347, 54 N.W. (2d) 681
(1952).
30 Harper v. Brennan, 311 Mich. 489, 18 N.W. (2d) 905 (1945); Standard Grocer
Co. v. Local 406, 321 Mich. 276, 32 N.W. (2d) 519 (1948).
31Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §423.17.
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through their employer...."32 The court ignored completely any distinction between recognition and organizational picketing. The test
applied was whether the picketing was to "publicize" substandard
wage and working conditions in the enterprise picketed, which the
court indicated it would permit, or was to bring economic pressure to
bear upon the employees to accept union representation regardless of
any advantages that might accrue to them. The court sustained the
injunction after the union representative admitted that picketing would
continue until the employees were organized regardless of the question
whether their working conditions were substandard or on a par with
union standards in the area. This holding presents the most clear-cut
challenge to date of the Gazzam dictum and it is surprising that the
United States Supreme Court recently declined the opportunity to
review this decision and another similar Michigan case.33
When the Court does consider the question, it is submitted that
the state prohibition of organizational picketing must either be sustained
against Fourteenth Amendment due process objections or the Court
must move back toward the Thornhill doctrine and away from the
rationale in the Gazzam-Hanke-Hughes trilogy. The Gazzam dictum
loses much of its force when set in the context of the Court's declared
respect for state determinations of the permissible scope of picketing.34
Where state courts focus attention upon the economic pressure upon
the,employer, whatever the union's avowed purpose, a strong argument
exists that the state must enjoin organizational picketing to prevent
facile subversion of a state policy approved by the Supreme Court in
the Gazzam case itself. Where the focus is upon coercion of employees,
as in the Postma case, it is difficµlt to see how a state policy against such
coercion could be regarded as arbitrary or capricious. The preservation
of a distinction between recognition and organizational picketing depends upon the untenable thesis that the freedom of employee choice
should only be protected against incursions by the employer and not
against union pressures.35 Although some NLRB decisions seem to ac32 Postma v. Intl. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 334 Mich. 347 at 355, 54 N.W. (2d)
681 (1952). For a similar analysis, see Way Baking Co. v. Teamsters and Truck Drivers
Local 164, 335 Mich. 479, 56 N.W. (2d) 357 (1953); Hall Steel Co. v. Intl. Brotherhood
of Teamsters, 22 CCH Lab. Cas. ,i67,163 (1952).
33 Certiorari was denied in the Postma case, 345 U.S. 922, 73 S.Ct. 779 (1953), and
in the Way Baking Co. case, (U.S. 1953) 73 S.Ct. 939, which raised both the question of
due process and the question of state jurisdiction over organizational picketing where the
dispute affects interstate commerce.
84 This argument is fully developed in Petro, ''Free Speech and Organizational Picketing in 1952," 4 LAB. L.J. 3 (1953).
85 See Lauritzen, "The Organizational Picket Line-Coercion," 3 STAN. L. REv. 413
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cept this distinction,36 state policy is not to be judged by its conformity
with federal labor law but rather by the "rational basis" test. A further
argument can be framed by analogy to the Court's willingness to accept
state protection of self-employed workers against picketing to compel
them to accept union standards.37 The union would of course argue
that the case of picketing the self-employed is different because there
is a greater interdependence of economic interest where the picketing
arises from a dispute with employees; this argument would seem to
depend, however, upon a clear showing of substandard conditions in the
enterprise picketed, and such a showing would probably not be possible
in the usual case of organizational picketing, for it is unlikely that picketing would be needed to induce employees to unionize if their working
conditions were materially substandard.
Admittedly, a Supreme Cour_t ruling that the states can constitutionally ban organizational picketing entails virtually a complete retreat
from the Thornhill position, for this would permit states in effect to
issue a blanket ban on all stranger picketing. However such a ruling
would seem to be a more logical consequence of the Court's present
recognition that picketing is coercive than the perpetuation of gossamer
distinctions based upon the union's subjective motivation.38 Other
channels of communication remain open to the union to state its case
to the public, and the union has well-protected opportunities to reach
the employees in the enterprise with rational arguments why they
should unionize. Where such arguments are not accepted, it seems
difficult to justify as a matter of constitutional policy the privilege to
use the weapon of picketing against employees who are helpless to
(1951). For a purported rebuttal in which the issue never seems to be squarely joined, see
Tobriner, ''The Organizational Picket Line-Lawful Economic Pressure," 3 STAN. L. RBv.
423 (1951).
36 At least in cases involving representation proceedings, the NLRB has held that
picketing for organizational purposes does not constitute a demand for recognition by the
union. Hamilton's, Ltd., 93 N.L.R.B. 1076 (1951); General Paint Corp., 95 N.L.R.B.
539 (1951). But compare Intl. Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local No. 41 (Union Chevrolet
Co.), 96 N.L.R.B. 957 (1951).
37Jntl. Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 70 S.Ct. 773 (1950). A
caveat may be entered here, however, for the Court in the Hanke case did not overrule the
earlier decision in Cafeteria Employees Union, Local 302 v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293, 64
S.Ct. 126 (1943), which struck down an injunction against picketing of a cafeteria run
by partners. The Angelos case is readily distinguishable, nevertheless, because the state
court injunction, like that in the Swing case, was based solely on the ground that there
was no labor .dispute.
38 The "motivation analysis" seems to prevail with the Court at present, however. See
Local Union No. 10 v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192, 73 S.Ct. 585 (1953) in which the Court
sustained an injunction against picketing for purposes in conflict with the Virginia Rightto-Work Act.
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defend themselves in this economic cold war while permitting injunction if the picketing is directed formally only against the employer.

IL State Jurisdiction Over Stranger Picketing Which Affects
Interstate Commerce
Since Congress failed to indicate expressly the extent to which the
Labor-Management Relations Act was intended to preempt the field of
labor relations law,39 debate has flourished as to what areas of regulation, if any, remain within state jurisdiction in the case of employers
and unions whose activities affect interstate commerce.40 It seems
clear that where a state statutory or common law rule conflicts with the
LMRA,41 or with its policy,42 or where there is a possibility of conflict,43 federal law prevails, but the real pre-emption problems arise
when a state attempts to exercise concurrent or supplementary jurisdiction in areas covered specifically or generally by the LMRA without
the sanction of express or clearly implied congressional approval.44
Although able arguments have been made that the entire subject of
picketing has been brought within exclusive federal jurisdiction,45
subject to the exception that the state's general police power may be
invoked to prevent violence and destruction of property,46 no authorita3 9 It is doubtful that even the most skilled draftsmanship could have solved all difficulties by a precise demarcation of the metes and bounds of federal jurisdiction, but the
amount of controversy since 1947 indicates that the problem merited more attention than
it received.
40 This problem gained dimension even before the enactment of the LMRA [Bethlehem
Steel Co. v. N.Y. State Lab. Rel. Bd., 330 U.S. 767, 67 S.Ct. 1026 (1947)], but the more
extensive labor regulation embodied in the LMRA created many additional areas of real
and potential confilct. General discussions of the pre-emption problem may be found in
Smith, ''The Taft-Hartley Act and State Jurisdiction over Labor Relations," 46 MrcH. L.
RBv. 593 (1948); Cox and Seidman, "Federalism and Labor Relations," 64 HARv. L. RBv.
211 (1950); for recent coverage see the interesting debate: Petro "Participation by the
States in the Enforcement and Development of National Labor Policy," N.Y.U. FIFTH
AmroAL CoNPERl!NCB ON LABoR l (1952), and Ratner, "Problems of Federal-State Jurisdiction in Labor Relations," N.Y.U. FIFTH AmmAL CoNPERl!NCE ON LABOR 77 (1952).
Mr. Ratner's article is also available in 3 LAB. L.J. 750 (1952). For a review of the
Supreme Court cases, see comment, 37 CoRN. L.Q. 515 (1952).
41 Jntl. Union, UAW-CIO v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454, 70 S.Ct. 781 (1950); Amalgamated Assn. of Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employees v. WERB, 340 U.S. 383,
71 S.Ct. 359 (1951).
42 Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 65 S.Ct. 1373 (1945).
43 La Crosse Telephone Corp. v. WERB, 335 U.S. 866, 69 S.Ct. 379 (1948).
44 No problem exists of course where Congress has expressly ceded jurisdiction to the
states. Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. WERB, 336 U.S. 301, 69 S.Ct. 584 (1949).
45 See articles by Cox and Seidman and by Ratner, supra note 40; for a contrary view,
see Petro, "State Jurisdiction to Control Recognition Picketing," 2 LAB. L.J. 883 (1951).
46 Support for this may be found in Allen-Bradley Local No. llll, United Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers of America v. WERB, 315 U.S. 740, 62 S.Ct. 820 (1942),
where a state injunction against mass picketing was sustained, and also in Intl. Union,
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tive ruling supports this broad an assertion, and the state courts, naturally, have been reluctant to surrender more than is absolutely required.
At present, Supreme Court decisions prohibit state regulation of conduct which constitutes an unfair labor practice under section 8 of the
NLRA47 or which constitutes a "protected concerted activity" under
section 7. 48 Some state courts, dealing with conduct which violates
federal law, have continued to exercise concurrent jurisdiction where
this was considered necessary to prevent irreparable injury during
the delay before NLRB action,49 but the better view is contrary,5°
and in most cases the problem assumes this shape: (1) Is the activity in
question protected or condemned under the LMRA? (2) If not, may
the state exercise jurisdiction in this "middle area"?51
Prior to a discussion of the central issues, two specific situations
deserve brief mention. Where the picketing involves a demand for a
closed shop or other union-security device which is forbidden by state
law, it would seem that the state would have a special claim in support
of jurisdiction, for Congress specifically gave the states authority to
regulate union security provisions. 52 On the other hand, unless one
accepts the concurrent jurisdiction thesis, it seems clear that the state
has no jurisdiction to enjoin recognition picketing where a union
UAW-CIO v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454 at 459, 70 S.Ct. 781 (1950). Since violence may
also be a violation of §8(b)(l)(A) of the NLRA, this would seem to be an exception to
the general rule against concurrent jurisdiction. For a full analysis of this problem and
the pertinent cases, see Petro, "State Jurisdiction to Regulate Violent Picketing," 3 LAB.
L.J. 3 (1952).
47This would seem to be the holding in the Court's one sentence per curiam decision
in Plankinton Packing Co. v. WERB, 338 U.S. 953, 70 S.Ct. 491 (1950). For the Court's
subsequent interpretation of the Plankinton case confirming this view, see Amalgamated
Assn. v. WERB, 340 U.S. 383 at 390, n. 12, and the dissenting opinion at 402, 71 S.Ct.
359 (1951).
48 See cases cited in notes 41 and 42 supra.
49 Montgomery Bldg. & Construction Trades Council v. Ledbetter Erection Co., (Ala.
1951) 57 S. (2d) 112, cert. dismissed because temporary injunction not a "final decree,"
344 U.S. 178, 73 S.Ct. 196 (1952); Tidewater-Shaver Barge Lines v. Dobson, (Ore. 1952)
245 P. (2d) 903.
5o Ryan v. Simons, 302 N.Y. 742, 98 N.E. (2d) 707 (1951); Norris Grain Co. v.
Nordaas, 232 Minn. 91, 46 N.W. (2d) 94 (1950); Gerry of California v. Superior Court,
32 Cal. (2d) 119, 194 P. (2d) 689 (1948).
51 For an excellent discussion of federal jurisdiction over stranger picketing and the
present status of federal labor law, see comment 20 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 109 (1952). The
writer there explores the possibilities of state jurisdiction in this "middle area" at much
greater length than is possible in this comment.
52Texas State Federation of Labor v. Brown & Root, Inc., (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) 246
S.W. (2d) 938. But see Pocahontas Corp. v. Bldg. Trades Council, (D.C. Me. 1950) 93
F. Supp. 217, where the union obtained removal to a federal court because the cause of
action was also cognizable under §8(b)(2) of the NLRA. Where the union's demand for a
union security provision does not violate the NLRA, but does violate the stricter provisions
of state law, it would seem that the state should clearly have jurisdicion to enforce its law.
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certified by the NLRB already represents the employees in the enterprise, for such picketing constitutes an unfair labor practice under
section 8(b)(4)(C) of the NLRA.53
Where there is no ~ertified union, and picketing occurs while
representation proceedings before the NLRB are pending or where
such proceedings have not been successfully initiated,54 the state courts
have divided on the question of jurisdiction. In the leading case of
Goodwins Inc. v. Hagedorn, 55 the New York Court of Appeals held
for state jurisdiction. The picketing was for recognition and this is not
an unfair labor practice under the NLRA for the most nearly applicable
sections of the act, 8(b)(4)(A) and (B),56 refer only to strikes. And
further, recognition picketing is not a concerted activity protected under
section 7 of the NLRA57 because, although not an unfair labor practice
in itself, its purpose is to compel the employer to commit an unfair
labor practice, namely, interference with his employees' choice of
representatives.58
A recent Pennsylvania decision59 challenges the New York court's
ruling on the basis that recognition picketing is an unfair labor practice
under section 8(b)(2) which forbids the union "to cause or attempt
to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation
of subsection [8](a)(3)." 60 This interpretation of section 8(b)(2),
however, is at least debatable. The specific forms of discrimination
mentioned in section 8(a)(3) are discrimination "in regard to hire or
tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment" ;61
recognition picketing does not necessarily involve union demands for
these particular forms of employer discrimination-indeed, the union
would be ill-advised even to hint at such demands-and no federal
decision has as yet found recognition picketing an unfair labor practice
where the union leaves the type of pressure to be exerted up to "the
worried resourcefulness of the employer." 62
5361 Stat. L. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §158(b)(4)(C).
54 It may be noted that the union can prevent an election by disclaiming representative
status and continue its picketing for organizational purposes. Cooper d.b.a. Smith's Hardware Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 1009 (1951); Ny-Lint Tool and Mfg. Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 642 (1948).
55 303 N.Y. 300, 101 N.E. (2d) 697 (1951).
56 61 Stat. L. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §158(b)(4)(A),(B).
57 61 Stat. L. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §157.
58 This position finds support in Thompson Products Inc., 72 N.L.R.B. 886 (1947);
cf. American News Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 1302 (1944).
59 Gamer d.b.a. Central Storage and Transfer Co. v. Teamster, Chauffeurs and Helpers
Local Union No. 776, (Pa. 1953) 94 A. (2d) 893.
60 61 Stat. L. 141, 29 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §l58(b)(2).
6161 Stat. L. 140, 29 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §l58(a)(3).
62 This was the analysis followed in Hall Steel Co. v. Intl. Brotherhood of Teamsters,
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Since both recognition and organizational picketing impose economic pressure upon the employees in the enterprise, to the extent that
such picketing is effective in hindering the employer's activity and
causing a lessening or cessation of business, it would seem that
such picketing would be an unfair labor practice under section
8(b)(l)(A),63 forbidding restraint or coercion of employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7, which includes the right
to refrain from joining a union. The legislative history of the NLRA
lends some support to such an interpretation, 64 and the NLRB has
ruled that a direct threat to an employee of loss of job65 and other forms
of economic pressure, such as a strike66 or threat to strike,67 constitute
coercion within the meaning of section 8(b)(l)(A), but the Board
has yet to overrule its holding in NLRB v. Local 74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America68 that peaceful stranger
picketing is persuasion and not coercion. The Board's tendency to
follow the Supreme Court's shifting analysis of the nature of picketing69 may yet result in the regulation of stranger picketing under section
8(b)(l)(A). In the meantime, at least one state court has assumed
jurisdiction of organizational picketing on the basis that it is not an
unfair labor practice under the federal law. 70 The court did not consider the question whether such picketing might be a protected concerted activity, but it would seem that a good argument can be made
that such picketing should not be protected since it violates the overriding policy of free employee choice as to union representation.71
In the absence of federal determination that recognition or organizational picketing constitute protected concerted activities or unfair
labor practices, the question remains: did Congress intend to foreclose
state jurisdiction over these middle area activities? The major support
for state jurisdiction is the Supreme Court's decision in the Briggs22 CCH Lab. Cas. ,r67,163 (1952). Cf. Denver Bldg. and Construction Trades Council,
90 N.L.R.B. 1768 (1950), enforced in NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Construction Trades
Council, (10th Cir. 1951) 192 F. (2d) 577; Intl. Longshoreman's·and Warehouseman's
Union, Local No. 16, CIO, 90 N.L.R.B. 1753 (1950).

63 61

Stat. L. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §158(b)(l)(A).
93 CoNc. REc. 4017 et seq. (1947).
65 Smith Cabinet Mfg. Co., 81 N.L.R.B. 886 (1949).
6 6 Pinkerton's National Detective Agency, 90 N.L.R.B. 205 (1950).
67 Clara Val Packing Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 703 (1949).
68 80 N.L.R.B. 533 (1948), enforced (6th Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 126.
69 See Denver Bldg. and Construction Trades Council, 90 N.L.R.B. 1768 at 1769
1770 (1950).
'
70 Hall Steel Co. v. Intl. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 22 CCH Lab. Cas. ,r67,163 (1952).
71 See Petro, "Free Speech and Organizational Picketing in 1952," 4 LAll. L.J. 3
(1953).
64
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Stratton case72 where the Court upheld a Wisconsin cease and desist

order against the union's intermittent work stoppages on the theory that
"This conduct is governable by the states or it is entirely ungoverned." 73
Opponents of state jurisdiction over stranger picketing argue that the
Briggs-Stratton decision is not applicable for that decision was limited
to permitting state jurisdiction over illegal union tactics and cannot
be extended to cases of stranger picketing where the illegality is predicated on motivation.74 The force of this argument is vitiated, however,
by the fact that stranger picketing can as well be designated an illegal
tactic to gain membership-as contrasted with such acceptable tactics
as speeches to the unorganized employees or other appeals to reasonand therefore any distinction between tactics and motives seems purely
verbal. 75 A stronger argument against state jurisdiction is that, unlike
the novel "quickie strike'' in the Briggs-Stratton case, stranger picketing
has been the subject of congressional attention in that Congress rejected
a bill sharply restricting stranger picketing and in the NLRA as finally
amended in 1947 dealt expressly only with collective action where
another union has been certified. 76 Therefore, it may be argued,
Congress intended that there should be no other restrictions. It has
been pointed out, however, that ordinarily no one would argue that
the mere rejection of a policy by Congress precludes a state from
adopting that policy, for "Any such canon of interpretation of Congressional lawmaking would magnify silence or inaction by Congress
to terrific proportions."77 Unless one assumes in the first place that
Congress intended to preclude state action, mere rejection is no more
than an ambiguous act. And further, any argument on the basis of
congressional intent seems somewhat weakened by the fact that unless
the ·states take action, the congressional policy of free employee choice
as to union representation is easily subverted by stranger picketing.
Rather than posit a conflicting intent, a congressional schizophrenia,
it would seem more reasonable to conclude that Congress had not
thoroughly considered the problem.
The legal vacuum that ensues if the state does not take jurisdiction
121nt1. Union, UAW-AFL v. WERB, 336 U.S. 245, 69 S.Ct. 516 (1949), commonly
known as the Briggs-Stratton case.
1s Id. at 254.
74 Ratner, "Problems of Federal-State Jurisdiction in Labor Relations," N.Y.U. FIFTH
AmmAL CoNFERENCB ON LA:soa 77 at 103-104 (1952).
75 This argument is fully developed in a comment, 20 Umv. Cm. L. REv. 109 at ll8
(1952).
76 Ratner, supra note 74, at 97-103.
77 Smith, "The Taft-Hartley Act and State Jurisdiction over Labor Relations," 46
M:rcH. L. REv. 593 at 613, n. 44 (1948).
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is difficult to justify in terms of a congressional intent to leave the
problem of stranger picketing to the free play of economic forces,
unhindered by the courts. For, unlike strikes, the employer and employees have no countervailing weapons against stranger picketing,
except perhaps where the picketing union includes a minority of the
employees, in which case the employer could discharge his picketing
employees and raise the question whether they were engaged in a protected concerted activity. Where the union represents none of the
employees, as in most of the cases considered in this comment, the
employer is helpless. If representation proceedings are pending, his
distress may be only temporary, but what of the situation where no
union is certified by the NLRB? And further, where the union prevents an election by disclaiming representative status,78 or where the
employer does not meet the jurisdictional requirements of the NLRB,79
the state courts afford the only means of breaking the deadlock. In such
situations, the pre-emption argument seems to exact an extremely high
price for symmetry in national labor law.
Perhaps the central weakness in the pre-emption argument against
state jurisdiction over these "middle area" activities is an assumption
that federal labor law is a complete, well thought out system of regulation. Experience has shown, it is submitted, that this assumption is not
valid. Unless the unions are more successful than they have been in
the past in securing removal to federal courts,80 it seems likely that state
courts will continue to shape the law in the peripheral area of stranger
picketing. State action at least has the virtue of underscoring the need
for a rationalization and clarification of national labor policy either by
the NLRB, through injecting new content into section 8(b)(l)(A) to
regulate stranger picketing,81 or preferably by congressional action.

Richard D. Rohr, S.Ed.
78 See cases cited in note 54
79 The problem of the legal

supra.
limbo that exists where the dispute affects interstate com•
merce but does not come within the NLRB's discretionary jurisdictional requirements is
extensively discussed in Feldblum, "Jurisdictional 'Tidelands' in Labor Relations," 38 VA.
L. R:sv. 187 (1952).
80 For possible methods of federal control over state action by the NLRB or the lower
federal courts, see Ratner, supra note 74, at 110-115.
81 This of course would not solve the problem raised in note 79 supra; indeed it would
aggravate ~e problem, for if the NLRB declared stranger picketing an unfair labor practice,
then state courts would seem to be precluded from jurisdiction under the holding in the
Plankinton case, 338 U.S. 953, 70 S.Ct. 491 (1950).

